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Abstract 
Francis Schüssler Fiorenza’s “emancipatory solidarity” theory is here proposed 
as the framework for an alternative Filipino soteriology that focuses not on the 
Cross as sole salvific event, but on Christ’s life, ministry, death, and 
resurrection in its entirety as key to human redemption in its fullness, including 
both the physical and spiritual dimensions. In contrast to the concept of 
redemption as the mere alleviation of suffering, this paper suggests an 
alternative interpretation of the Filipino virtue of fortitude in the face of 
suffering as in itself constitutive of a redemptive religious moment and 
experience. 
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or as by one man’s disobedience many were made 
sinners, so by one man’s obedience many will be made 
righteous. By his obedience unto death, Jesus accomplished 
the substitution of the suffering Servant who makes himself 
an offering for sin, when he bore the sin of many, and who 
shall make many to be accounted righteous, for he shall bear 
their iniquities. Jesus atoned for our faults and made 
satisfaction for our sins to the Father.1 
Thus did the Church, from the very beginning of its biblical and 
catechetical literature, articulate the meaning and significance of Christ’s 
death on the cross. Christ died “to be the expiation for our sins” (1 Jn. 
4:10) “in accordance with the scriptures” (1 Cor. 15:3), that is, “to give his 
life as a ransom for many” (Mt. 20:28).  
Why did Jesus die? Here lies perhaps the most important and critical 
theological question in relation to Christianity’s claim to Christ’s universal 
significance. That he was executed can be explained in fairly socio-political 
terms as the inevitable end to the kind of battles he waged. But in the 
greater scheme of things, what is the deeper religious meaning of his 
death? Is it a form of ransom necessary to pay for the debt incurred by the 
sins of humanity? Is it because, according to a widely held belief in Israel, 
the death of a just man atones for the sins of the land?2 Or is the death of  
 
 
 
 
1 Episcopal Commission on Catechesis and Catholic Education (ECCCE), Catechism of the 
Catholic Church (Vatican: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1994; repr., Manila: Word &Life Publications, 
1994), no. 615. 
2 A well-known example of this idea appears in Deutero-Isaiah 42, 49, 50, and 52, where the 
servant becomes an instrument of divine redemption through his suffering and death. In the New 
Testament, Jesus himself was often identified with this Old Testament image of “the Servant of 
the Lord” (Mt. 8:17; 12:18–21; Lk. 22:37; Acts 3:13, 26; 4:27, 30). This image in Second Isaiah is 
clearly evident in 1 Pt. 2:22–25: “He committed no sin . . . He himself bore our sins in his body on 
the cross . . . by his wounds you have been healed.” See Richard P. McBrien, Catholicism, rev. and 
enl. 3rd ed. (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1994; repr., London: Geoffrey Chapman, 2000), 
444. 
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Jesus existentially redemptive insofar as it demonstrates the degree of 
commitment necessary toward achieving an authentic humanity?  
But if Christ’s sufferings were the payment for our sins, to whom was 
the payment made? And why should the payment be exacted in such a 
violent manner? How can one person be humanity’s scapegoat, taking the 
place of the rest for their sins?3 
In current Western theology, soteriological theories focusing on 
expiation, satisfaction, and sacrifice have been greatly criticized. Lisa Cahill 
summarizes this rather pessimistic theological trend criticizing the 
expiation theories: 
In the view of modern critics, the paradigm of Jesus’ death 
as atoning sacrifice, especially if seen as penal substitution, 
seems to compromise God’s mercy, to make God demand 
and even engineer innocent suffering, and to make a 
suffering death the entire purpose of the incarnation. It sets 
up violence as divinely sanctioned and encourages human 
beings to imitate or submit to it.4 
The atonement paradigm, in effect, turns God into an object of terror, 
and calls into question divine justice, or even reason. It is incompatible 
with the loving and compassionate God that Jesus faithfully preached. 
How could such a concept, then, be truly Christian?5  
The sacrificial and propitiatory language of scripture and Church 
catechetical tradition holds sway in popular Filipino religiosity. As Beltran 
points out, this perspective is “still powerful in the Filipino context 
because it corresponds to the people’s religious expectations. It is 
fundamental to the Filipino religious experience.”6  
 
 
 
3 Benigno P. Beltran, The Christology of the Inarticulate: An Inquiry into the Filipino Understanding of 
Jesus the Christ (Manila: Divine Word Publications, 1987), 96. 
4  Lisa Sowle Cahill, “Quaestio Disputata The Atonement Paradigm: Does It Still Have 
Explanatory Value?” Theological Studies 68 (2007): 419. 
5 Robert J. Daly, “Images of God and the Imitation of God: Problems with Atonement,” 
Theological Studies 68 (2001): 41. 
6 Beltran, Christology of the Inarticulate, 96–97. 
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Hence, certain questions relative to a genuine scriptural hermeneutics, 
in general, and to a specifically Filipino soteriology, in particular, can be 
raised: Can the language of sacrifice, expiation, and punishment do justice 
to the God that Jesus proclaimed in the Gospels? If , according to popular 
Filipino religious imagination, redemption holds that Christ appeased a 
wrathful God, or that Jesus was punished in our place, wouldn’t this 
concept of a punitive God have become a ready instrument for the 
subjugation of the Filipino people by their colonial masters? Does the 
monstrous view of God who cries for the blood of the innocent to 
appease his wrath help Filipinos overcome their brand of fatalism, which 
consigns everything to fate and the divine will, including the structural 
roots of their poverty and oppression?7 And how does one, in the first 
place, even begin to talk about suffering and salvation in the concrete 
context of widespread poverty and the dehumanizing destitution of many  
Filipinos, which in many ways constitute a blatant violation of human 
dignity, and hence, ultimately of God’s will? 8  These and many 
other crucial questions that challenge the classical theories of 
redemption, taken to be self-evident for centuries, make it all the  
more urgent to explore alternative discourses on atonement and 
redemption. This paper is one such modest attempt. 
This essay begins with a brief discussion of popular Filipino views on 
the meaning of Jesus’s death on the cross, consistent with classical theories 
of atonement. Do such theories really shape Filipino fatalism and reinforce 
passivity in the face of suffering? What does salvation mean in a context of 
abject poverty and marginalization? Can the classical soteriological 
literature still be a credible apologetic under those conditions? On the 
other hand, should redemption always include liberation of the whole  
 
 
 
 
7 Ibid., 97–98. 
8 See Catholic Bishops’ Conference of the Philippines (CBCP), The Acts and Decrees of the Second 
Plenary Council of the Philippines (Manila: CBCP Secretariat, 1992), nos. 122–25. 
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person—spiritual and physical? Can’t the virtues of forbearance and 
fortitude in the face of suffering have an intrinsic redemptive value? These 
are just some of the important questions that are addressed in this first part 
of the study.  
The second section gives an overview of classic theories of atonement, 
focusing on existentialist Christological models, which serve as background 
to Fiorenza’s soteriological model. The third section introduces Francis 
Schüssler Fiorenza’s theory of “emancipatory solidarity,”9 here presented 
as a response to the shortcomings of the other models. This part of the 
essay demonstrates how Fiorenza’s understanding of salvation in terms of 
solidarity provides a more encompassing concept of human redemption in 
its fullness.  
Finally, the essay compares Fiorenza’s Christology with Filipino 
Christologies, discussing similarities and contrasts between Filipino views 
of redemption and Fiorenza’s emancipatory solidarity. Particular attention 
is devoted to exploring the Christology of popular nineteenth century 
peasant movements and the Katipuneros through Rafael C. Ileto’s Pasyon and 
Revolution,10  by reinterpreting popular Christ images in the light of 
Fiorenza’s Christology and arguing that the former can be understood as 
exemplifications of the latter. The essay ends by suggesting a positive 
retrieval of a Filipino perspective that views fortitude in the face of 
suffering as in itself constitutive of a redemptive moment and experience.  
 
 
 
 
 
9 This paper is inspired by my reading of Fiorenza’s survey and critique of existential and 
transcendental approaches to atonement and redemption, and summarizes the key points in his 
article “Redemption” in The New Dictionary of Theology, ed. Joseph A. Komonchak, Mary Collins, 
and Dermot A. Lane (Pasay City: St. Paul Publications, 1991), 845–48, and in his “Critical Social 
Theory and Christology: Toward an Understanding of Atonement and Redemption as 
Emancipatory Solidarity,” Proceedings of the Catholic Theological Society of America 30 (1975): 63–110. 
Professor Fiorenza is the Charles Chauncey Stillman Professor of Roman Catholic Studies at 
Harvard Divinity School in Cambridge, Massachusetts. 
10  Reynaldo C. Ileto, Pasyon and Revolution: Popular Movements in the Philippines, 1840-1910 
(Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila Press, 1979). The Pasyon—a popular Filipino Catholic devotion—
are native accounts of Christ’s life, death, and resurrection chanted during Lent.  
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Popular Views on the Meaning and Implications  
of Christ’s Suffering 
More than the Child Jesus (the Santo Niño), perhaps the Filipino Christ 
is pre-eminently the Crucified One. Beaten, scourged, humiliated, and 
defeated, he suffers in the place of others, for the sake of others. The 
favorite images of Christ represent some episode of his Passion (the 
carrying of the cross, the flogging at the column, the crowning with 
thorns).11 In many places in the Philippines, devotees express solidarity 
with the Suffering Christ by flagellating themselves during Holy Week, or 
kissing the feet of the entombed Christ (the Sto. Entierro) on Fridays, or 
engaging in a frenzied mass procession carrying the image of the Black 
Nazarene.12 The devotion to these images speaks of quiet suffering in the 
face of persecution and terrible human ordeals, and manifests the Filipino’s 
admirable fortitude in the face of trial and adversity. The kundiman, for 
instance, which are native songs about wounded love,13 describe the sense 
of inner strength and self-sacrificing love that abandons itself completely 
to fate or the divine will in the face of inevitable suffering. 
 Benigno Beltran, in his ground-breaking book, The Christology of the 
Inarticulate: An Inquiry into the Filipino Understanding of Jesus the Christ, 
articulates clearly the context of this fixation on the sufferings of Christ. 
He writes: 
In a country where poverty, deprivation and oppression are 
the common lot of the masses, where typhoons and 
earthquakes frequently occur, it is not surprising that the  
 
 
 
 
 
11 See Frank Lynch, “Organized Religion,” Area Handbook of the Philippines, vol. 2, 485, cited in 
Douglas J. Elwood and Patricia L. Magdamo, Christ in Philippine Context (Quezon City: New Day 
Publishers, 1971), 6. 
12  Elwood and Magdamo, Christ in Philippine Context, 6. Cf. ECCCE, Catechism for Filipino 
Catholics (Manila: Word & Life Publications, 1997), nos. 467–68 
13 See ECCCE, Catechism for Filipino Catholics, no. 39. 
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image of the Crucified One, head bowed, mouth agape in  
excruciating agony, provides consolation and an outlet for 
pent-up emotions of sympathy and tragedy for the ignorant 
and the heavy-laden.14 
 The Filipino Christ incidentally takes after the Christ of Spanish 
popular faith, whose distinguishing marks are essentially “a profound  
sense of tragedy, a terrible dread of death, and a religious fervor that 
dwells, sometimes morbidly, on the wounds and agony of Christ.” 15  
This collective sense of anguish and pathos relates, no doubt, to the long 
experience of oppression by the Spanish people who, from A.D. 711 to 
1492, were under occupation by the Moors.16  
As a form of popular faith and piety, the Filipino devotion to the 
Suffering Christ, however, has been criticized for being much too 
privatistic. Tibay ng loob (courage, inner strength), pakikiramay (empathy), 
and pagtitimpi (restraint)—all virtues associated with the Crucified Christ—
still remain simply on the personal and interpersonal levels. Given the 
social conditions of untold suffering in the Philippines, a social 
consciousness is never developed when there is an excessive 
sentimentalism focused on the suffering and death of Christ. “The cult of 
images,” Beltran observes, “can easily become instrumentalized. It can 
evolve into a form of idolatry when it becomes an end in itself and is used 
to legitimize oppression and passivity in the face of injustice.”17 How many  
of those, for instance, who inflict violence on others have been unwittingly  
 
 
 
 
14 Beltran, The Christology of the Inarticulate, 123. 
15 Elwood and Magdamo, Christ in Philippine Context, 2. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Beltran, The Christology of the Inarticulate, 135. Local passion narratives, however, that were 
given a more liberationist interpretation have been instrumental in inspiring the birth of peasant 
resistance movements. As mentioned earlier, this is the subject of Ileto’s well-known study about 
how the Pasyon provided 19th-century lowland Tagalog movements with a language for articulating 
their own values and ideals, particularly in view of their hopes for social emancipation and political 
liberation. See Jose Mario C. Francisco, “Christian Symbols and Rituals in Philippine Society,” 
Pulso 7 (June 1991): 16. See Ileto, Pasyon and Revolution, 11–12. A more detailed treatment of how 
images and symbols of popular piety—particularly the passion narratives—can become 
instruments of social and political conscientization appears in the final section of this paper. 
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influenced by a salvation theory about a God who demands the blood of 
the innocent as recompense for humanity’s transgressions? How many 
wars have been waged, prisoners executed, spouses and children abused 
largely as a result of a perception that God tolerates violence—imposes it, 
in fact, when necessary—as a means of salvation?  
The fixation on suffering as pagtitiis (forbearance), it would seem, while 
potentially cathartic, could lend credence to the charge that religion—like a 
mind-altering narcotic—simply numbs consciousness to human suffering. 
Does this kind of soteriology, then, help give true consolation to the 
suffering masses in the face of their unspeakable misery, or does it simply 
provide a coping mechanism that, while temporarily relieving their 
sorrows, merely perpetuates their unjust condition? Is a wife who absorbs 
spousal abuse supposed to feel good when told that her pagtitiis and 
pagtitimpi will merit her a reward in the life beyond? Doesn’t this approach 
to atonement and redemption continue to infantilize the faith of the 
Filipino Catholic by not allowing it to grow beyond an ethic much too 
obsessed with the pursuit of individual salvation in the afterlife, while not 
recognizing the many manifestations of salvation in this one. On the other 
hand, isn’t the total acceptance of suffering in complete submission to 
God’s will, and the forbearance required to endure it (the way countless 
pious Filipino Catholics have lived their faith with fortitude through the 
centuries), not itself a potentially genuine experience of redemption? Need 
salvation be always the alleviation, and not simply the endurance, of suffering?  
Soteriological Paradigms 
The Pauline Paradigm and Atonement Models 
A diversity of interpretations can be gathered from the New Testament 
regarding the meaning of Jesus’s death. For instance, Paul, who is perhaps 
the most prolific and imaginative of early theologians of Christ's death,18 
interpreted Jesus’s death using categories from Jewish cult, juridic thought, 
 
18 Cahill, The Atonement Paradigm, 418. 
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as well as Hellenistic mystery religions and Gnostic myths.19 Johannine 
theology, on the other hand, sees not the Cross, but the incarnation of the 
Son in the world and his return to the Father as that which is essentially 
salvific. Jesus’s death is but a means, however important, towards the 
exaltation of the Son of Man.20 
Theological reflection in Church history likewise reveals a variety of 
soteriological understandings of Jesus’s death, attempting to articulate its 
meaning and significance in terms of atonement and redemption. Three 
fundamental atonement theories have been put forward in Christian 
thought: (1) the ransom theory; (2) the satisfaction or substitutionary 
atonement theory; and (3) the moral influence or exemplary atonement 
theory.  
A specific model of salvation, associated with Anselm of Canterbury (d. 
1109) has become the dominant soteriological model in the West since the 
eleventh century, despite the variety of biblical theologies of salvation.  
“This is the model of Christ's death as a substitutionary sacrifice for 
human sin, needed to repay a debt to God, whose infinite honor has been 
offended past the limit of any purely human act of compensation.”21 
 
 
19 See Rudolf Bultmann, Theology of the New Testament, trans. K. Grobel (New York: Charles 
Scribner’s Sons, 1951), 292–306. Cf. Joseph A. Fitzmyer, “Pauline Theology,” in The New Jerome 
Biblical Commentary, 2nd ed., ed. Raymond E. Brown, Joseph A. Fitzmyer, and Roland E. Murphy 
(Quezon City: Claretian Publications, 1993), 82:24–80, 1388–1402. 
20  See Werner Kümmel, The Theology of the New Testament, trans. J. E. Steely (New York-
Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1973), 298. Cf. Francis J. Moloney, “Johannine Theology,” The New 
Jerome Biblical Commentary, 83:27–40, 1421–1423. 
21 Cahill, The Atonement Paradigm, 419. Doubtless the most dominant interpretation of Jesus’s 
death since the Middle Ages, this satisfaction theory proposed by Anselm of Canterbury holds that 
the order in the universe which was disturbed by sin could only be restored if sufficient 
satisfaction were offered to God. Only a divine person like Jesus could adequately compensate for 
the cosmic effects of Adam’s fault. And so he who was sinless endured death as a voluntary 
payment for sin, taking our place and offering a ransom of “satisfaction” to God for the insult of 
sin. See McBrien, Catholicism, 297, 482. Cf. Fiorenza, “Redemption,”, 842.  Cf. David Van Biema, 
“Why Did Jesus Die?” Time, April 12, 2004, 42. The exemplarity theory of redemption, on the 
other hand, advanced by the French medieval theologian Peter Abelard (d. 1142), focused less on 
Jesus’s death as recompense for the forgiveness of humanity’s sin than as the exemplification of a 
life of perfect love. Jesus’s fundamental moral commitment of love that reveals God’s loving 
presence evokes in human beings a response of love that not only becomes the basis for 
forgiveness, but ultimately overcomes humanity’s alienation from God. It is ultimately his life, not 
his death in itself, which can save us. See Fiorenza, “Redemption,” 842–43. Cf. Van Biema, “Why 
Did Jesus Die?” 45. 
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Modern theology, for its part, moves between subjective and objective 
interpretations of Jesus’s death as atonement and redemption. Subjective 
soteriological interpretations of the Cross find the classical theories of 
redemption insufficient insofar as atonement was understood in light of 
such categories as representation, substitution, satisfaction, and 
propitiation. “Guilt and sin are individual,” argues Francis Schüssler 
Fiorenza, “and cannot be transferred. Redemption is both an effect and 
cause of personal influence.”22 Objective theories of redemption, on the 
other hand, find the subjective theories much too focused on individualism 
and hardly appreciative of the social aspects of personal sin, guilt, and 
human nature itself.23 
Notwithstanding the wealth of diversity with respect to soteriological 
interpretations of Jesus’s death, modern theology has laid greater emphasis 
on his death, often at the expense of the much broader dimensions of 
redemption and the traditional elements thereof. Focusing on the death of 
Jesus as the pivotal point of understanding redemption often overlooks the 
salvific value of his entire life: his teaching and bold proclamation of God’s 
Rule, his healings and miracles that indicated God’s Reign already breaking 
into history, and his prophetic clash with evil in the form of oppressive 
power and domination. 
This emphasis on Jesus’s death as constitutive of human redemption is 
due in large measure to the existentialist trend in much of modern 
theology, and is perpetuated by the reaction to this trend. 
The Existentialist Influence24 
Karl Rahner sees Jesus’s death as his act of radical self-donation and 
self-acceptance expressive of the meaning and significance of both his 
divinity and humanity. Central to his soteriology is Jesus’s death as an  
 
 
 
22 Fiorenza, “Redemption,” 849. 
23 Ibid. 
24  Two theologians of the twentieth century who recognize their indebtedness to the 
existential philosophy of Martin Heidegger are Karl Rahner and Rudolf Bultmann. See Fiorenza, 
“Critical Social Theory and Christology,” 67–68. 
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act of personal realization. The very mode of God’s Self-disclosure is 
manifested through God’s Word (Logos). This divine Self-communication 
reaches its highpoint in the Self-emptying act of the Logos incarnate to 
precisely express the nature of God as love.25 This divine Self-giving in 
love manifests itself fully in the death of Jesus. Being both divine and 
human, Jesus’s death realizes God’s totally unconditional Self-giving to the 
world as well as the unequivocal human response to it.26 
While Rahner criticizes classic soteriology for failing to take serious 
account of Jesus’s human activity and life, he assigns to Jesus’s death an 
almost primordial and absolute meaning—effecting God’s universal 
salvific will through Jesus’s voluntary obedience and surrender to God. As 
a result, Rahner has reservations about how the other acts of Jesus’s life 
could have salvific value.27 But does not the redemptive activity of Jesus 
involve his entire life, a life that inevitably led to his execution? 
Furthermore, given Rahner’s own acknowledgment of the threat of any 
form of death in all of human experience (oppression, infirmity, misery, 
suffering, and the like), would Jesus himself not have faced all threats to 
human life and well-being? Isn’t the human drive for solidarity and the 
creation and protection of life, then, an equally fundamental human 
principle as the phenomenon of death itself? Redemption, then, should be 
understood as a much more comprehensive event that not only  
includes the confrontation with the problem of death, but also involves the 
redemptive power of the human desire for solidarity and new life.28  
Rudolf Bultmann, the premiere New Testament scholar of the 
twentieth century, posits a theology of the cross that challenges the Greek 
and modern scientific predisposition towards self-sufficiency and the 
notion that self-identity and salvation are within one’s power through the 
 
25 Karl Rahner, Theological Investigations, vol. 1, trans. K. Smyth (New York: Seabury, 1974), 
105–20. 
26 Karl Rahner, “Salvation,” in Sacramentum Mundi, vol. 2 (New York: Herder and Herder, 
1970), 430ff. 
27 Fiorenza, “Redemption,” 845–46. 
28 See Fiorenza, “Critical Social Theory and Christology,” 72. 
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discovery of knowledge. 29  Driven by overconfidence in the power of 
reason and human effort, this worldview finds its negation in the scandal 
of the cross which dismisses as pure illusion the ability to control one’s 
future. Only in taking on a new self-understanding and through God’s 
grace can we move towards an authentic kind of existence.30 
While Bultmann’s position provides an insightful look into the relation 
between human frailty and divine grace, his contrast between human effort 
and divine grace appears excessive. 31  While Bultmann shares Rahner’s 
opinion that Jesus’s death as propitiatory sacrifice is insufficient a theory in 
interpreting the cross, both confine the locus of redemption to the death 
of Jesus. The life and message of Jesus is appreciated only in view of his 
death. Human existence should be viewed not only in terms of its limit 
situations, especially the finality of death, but more holistically to include 
the creative imperative of affirming life in the socio-political order.32 
Critique of the Existentialist Appropriation 
Wolfhart Pannenberg criticizes Bultmann for his characteristically 
salvific approach to Christology, an approach that is vulnerable to both 
subjective reductionism and Feuerbach’s critique of religion as mere 
projection of the human spirit in the concept of God. 33  Pannenberg 
proposes an alternative approach that asserts the objective nature of 
Christology—a presupposition that can be questioned in many respects 
since it is grounded in the assumption that truth, and in this case, 
Christological truth, can be established a priori.34 
 
 
29 Rudolf Bultmann, Jesus Christ and Mythology (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1958), 35–
44. 
30 See Fiorenza, “Redemption,” 845. 
31 See Fiorenza, “Critical Social Theory and Christology,” 78. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid., 79. 
34  Wolfhart Pannenberg, Jesus—God and Man, trans. L. L. Wilkins and D. A. Priebe 
(Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1968), 21–48. See Fiorenza, “Critical Social Theory and 
Christology,” 80. 
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To forestall such criticisms, Pannenberg, makes the historical Jesus his 
point of departure and not the Jesus as he can be existentially engaged in 
the present. Pannenberg believes that Jesus’s death and resurrection were 
events that happened to him and were not explicitly determined by his 
own initiative and actions. Jesus could have sensed, Pannenberg 
acknowledges, the fatal consequences of his radical message when he 
confronted the powerful elite of Jerusalem. Pannenberg, however, does 
not push this awareness on the part of Jesus to its logical conclusion. But 
since Jesus remained unequivocal about his understanding of his message, 
would Jesus not have known the terrible risks it involved?35 
Secondly, while Pannenberg acknowledges the objective value of the 
cross as a form of service to others, he is not certain whether Jesus’s death 
comes as a direct consequence of this service or a service in and of itself. 
Hence, Pannenberg weakens the link between Jesus’s death and his 
conscious, active service to humanity.36 
Despite Pannenberg’s emphasis on the universal elements in Jesus’s 
ministry, he disengages the death of Jesus from his life and message. 
Pannenberg argues, therefore, that while Jesus’s fate was sealed by his 
revolutionary message, the significance of his death cannot be drawn from 
the consequential effect of his ministry.37 His death was simply the penalty 
endured in place of the people who deserved it, bound as they were to the 
authority of the law.38 
Relative to Rahner and Bultmann, Pannenberg sees the significance of 
Jesus’s death as separate from his life ministry. Given his rejection of an 
incarnational approach to Christology, Jesus’s death, in Pannenberg’s 
account, owes its significance not to his life but to his resurrection.39 It is 
his rising from the dead that invests the cross with its ultimate significance 
since the life of Jesus is no longer accessible to us in its original historical 
sense. 
 
35 See Fiorenza, “Critical Social Theory and Christology,” 81. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid., 82. 
39 Ibid., 81–82. 
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Pannenberg criticizes the much too individualistic emphasis the penal 
theory of substitution puts on guilt and responsibility, but does not 
critically take into account the social network and presuppositions in which 
the same theory operated.40 
In The Crucified God, 41  Jürgen Moltmann’s reactions to Bultmannian 
existentialism determine his constructive theories for a theology of the 
cross. Moltmann agrees with Bultmann’s objections against any effort to 
objectify Jesus’s death as a mere event of a historical past. However, 
Moltmann observes that Bultmann’s understanding of the cross seemingly 
refuses to acknowledge any kind of inherent significance in Jesus’s death, 
and that the cross can be meaningful and significant only if existentially 
engaged in the present.42 
Going beyond the idea of the cross as expiatory sacrifice, Moltmann 
makes a distinctive contribution by arguing that the death of Jesus 
expresses the significance of the resurrection, and not the other way 
around.43 The proleptic vision of the resurrection is significant insofar as 
the one who was raised dies in our place. The resurrection, then, is not 
some mere future event, but a moment of love that liberates all humanity.44 
In an act of utter oblation, Jesus rendered the defining moment not 
only for himself, but for the God he so faithfully embodied. In the death 
of Jesus, an intertrinitarian event that involved God and the Son, we 
witness God taking on the sins of the world, enduring suffering, guilt, and 
punishment, which a sinful humanity rightly deserved. Nowhere is God 
more fully God’s self than in this act of humiliation, nowhere more divine  
than in this solidarity with a fallen humanity. What takes place in Jesus 
 
40 Ibid., 84. 
41  Jürgen Moltmann, The Crucified God: The Cross of Christ as the Foundation and Criticism of 
Christian Theology, trans. R. A. Wilson and J. Bowden (New York: Harper and Row, 1974). 
42 See Fiorenza, “Critical Social Theory and Christology,” 84–85. 
43 See Fiorenza, “Redemption,” 847. 
44 See Fiorenza, “Critical Social Theory and Christology,” 85. 
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crucified is something that happens to God’s inmost self: not a death of 
God, but a death within God.45  
God’s solidarity with a sinful and suffering humanity through the death 
of Jesus proves to be a deeply meaningful and significant theodicy in light 
of the intolerable suffering of millions today. Furthermore, this theology of 
a suffering God provides Christianity with its distinctive identity that is 
neither grounded in church affiliation, creedal confession, and conversion 
experiences, nor in socio-political involvement for the cause of social 
justice.46 
Moltmann’s interpretation, however, raises two questions: First, by 
speaking of God as someone who “Himself” suffers from the evil of the 
world, isn’t Moltmann assigning an ontological existence to evil that it 
should not have in the first place?47 Aren’t people more confident in a God 
who liberates them from their suffering, rather than in one who simply 
identifies with their predicament? Our religious symbolic language, it 
would seem, should meaningfully address the fundamental ambiguity of 
human existence.  
Second, by identifying the cross as Christianity’s distinguishing feature, 
Moltmann runs the risk of confining Christian identity to one element—
namely, its prophetic role—at the expense of equally important aspects of 
Christianity such as commitment to God and neighbor.48  While the 
prophetic implications of the cross constitute an essential element of the 
Christian vision, identifying it as the essential core indiscriminately rejects 
all other ecclesial and institutional expressions of Christian identity.49  
 
 
 
 
45 Jürgen Moltmann, Le Dieu crucifié: La croix du Christ, fondement et critique de la théologie chrétienne 
(Paris: Cerf, 1974), 232–35, cited in Louis-Marie Chauvet, Symbol and Sacrament: A Sacramental 
Reinterpretation of Christian Existence, trans. Patrick Madigan and Madeleine Beaumont (Collegeville, 
PA: Liturgical Press, 1995), 502–3. This book by Moltmann is the French translation of the 
German original. 
46 Fiorenza, “Critical Social Theory and Christology,” 86. 
47 Ibid., 87. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Ibid., 87–88. 
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Moreover, reducing the Church to its socio-political involvement makes 
the Church liable to be dismissed as merely one among the current 
ideologies in society. Christian faith and praxis should assume a more 
constructive, rather than purely critical, function that gives religious 
interests on behalf of social justice and peace concrete human expression. 
In light of present socio-political realities, it is necessary to construct a 
theology of atonement and redemption that does not disengage the life and 
message of Jesus from his death, but sees his entire life as redemptive, and 
his death, a consequence of his lifelong commitment to God’s Rule in the 
world.50 
The Theology of Emancipatory Solidarity 
Critical Social Theory 
In contradistinction to the Rahnerian and Bultmannian existentialist 
approach with its singular focus on the cross as the locus of redemption, 
and to Pannenberg’s objectivistic and Moltmann’s speculative metaphysics, 
Francis Fiorenza proposes a theology of atonement of redemption based 
on Jürgen Habermas’s critical social theory.51 Habermas’s critique of an 
objectivistic understanding of theory and of knowledge that is detached 
from existential human interests and praxis leads him to a theory of 
understanding that is situated within a vast network of interest and 
application.52  
Habermas particularly objects to a thoroughly behavioristic and 
objectivistic approach to social scientific knowledge that fails to take into 
account the unfolding of human understanding within the context of the 
interpreter’s horizons.53  Given the symbolic and polyvalent nature of  
 
 
 
50 Ibid., 89. 
51 Ibid., 91. 
52 Ibid., 92. 
53 Ibid. Cf. Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, rev. 2nd ed., trans. Joel Weinsheimer and 
Donald Marshall (New York: Sheed & Ward, 1989). 
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language and the intentional nature of human consciousness, one should 
not overlook the subjective presuppositions of the interpreting subject.54 
To understand is to acknowledge multiple possibilities of meaning latent in 
a particular subject examined.55 It is, therefore, necessary to engage in a 
hermeneutical process, given the semiotic nature of language.  
While it is true that the hermeneutical method is necessary in 
acknowledging that understanding is mediated symbolically through 
language and the tradition engendered by such a process, Habermas 
criticizes the tendency of tradition to be uncritical of its own social 
injustices in the form of structures of domination, such as patriarchy, 
among others. Tradition is certainly the very matrix of understanding as 
event. However, tradition is not merely a complex of linguistically 
articulated ideas, but also a web of patterns that may reflect certain unjust 
social structures. Tradition is more than that which binds us to past 
enlightened views.56 
Habermas’s theory of knowledge, together with his theory of 
communicative competence, calls for a theological language that is not 
merely linguistically competent, but performatory and pragmatic. It 
provides the groundwork for Fiorenza’s theology of redemption as 
emancipatory solidarity. 57  Truth assertions necessarily have practical 
implications.58 Over and against a more precise, univocal, and technical  
form of language, contemporary theology, like sciences of social action,  
 
 
 
54 Paul Ricoeur uses the term “polysemy” in reference to the intrinsic opacity and richness of 
language. See Don Ihde, ed., “Editor’s Introduction,” in The Conflict of Interpretations: Essays in 
Hermeneutics (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1974), xiv.  
55  See Paul Ricoeur, “Existence and Hermeneutics,” trans. Kathleen McLaughlin, in The 
Conflict of Interpretations, 13. Cf. Paul Ricoeur, “The Problem of Double Meaning,” trans. Kathleen 
McLaughlin, in The Conflict of Interpretations, 68–69. 
56 Fiorenza, “Critical Social Theory and Christology,” 93. 
57  See ibid., 94–97. Communicative competence involves not only the ability to learn a 
language’s abstract system of rules (linguistic competence), but also the facility for communication 
and the mastery of symbolic interaction. Language not only describes reality, but performs it as 
well. Verbs such as “promise” and “command” demonstrate this pragmatic function of language. 
See ibid., 94–96. 
58 Ibid., 95. 
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possesses an inherent emancipatory interest.59  Further implications for 
theology of Habermas’s critique of social scientific knowledge include 
engaging in critical self-reflection and critique of ideologies uncritical of 
their own power structures.60 
Redemption as Emancipatory Solidarity 
Since there is an intrinsic nexus between theory and praxis, classical 
theories of atonement and redemption should be examined within the 
context of the symbolic network of the culture that shaped them. Our 
assertions of faith are always historically conditioned.61 There is in culture a 
multi-leveled system of connections between and among such elements as 
social symbols, political patterns, and diverse human interests.62 We bring 
our Faith to a level of conscious expression against the background, and 
within the matrix, of our existential questions and concerns. Hence, 
statements of faith should not be examined apart from their socio-
historical milieu since these are attempts to appropriate the Faith using 
categories of one’s lived culture. There is a world not only in front of, but 
also behind the text. Jose de Mesa and Lode Wostyn, famous for their 
contextual Filipino theology, write: 
People never experience salvation in the abstract, but in the 
context of their own life, within particular social and cultural 
patterns. This means that we do not have to speak about 
salvation in strange, “supernatural” terms; it can be put into 
ordinary language, the language of genuine dialogue with 
people and of experiences of specific liberating events.63 
 
 
 
59 Ibid., 96. 
60 Ibid. 
61 See Roger Haight, Dynamics of Theology (New York: Paulist Press, 1990), 175–79. 
62  See Fiorenza, “Critical Social Theory and Christology,” 98. Cf. Chauvet, Symbol and 
Sacrament, 84. 
63 Jose M. de Mesa and Lode L. Wostyn, Doing Christology: The Re-Appropriation of a Tradition 
(Quezon City: Claretian Publications, 1989), 32. 
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One should, therefore, not only determine the meaning of redemption 
theories formally and structurally, but also uncover the social structures 
and political patterns that shaped the way they are formulated. A critical 
hermeneutical issue that can be raised, for instance, today is whether it is 
still appropriate to meaningfully speak of a redeeming God in terms of 
patriarchal categories and patterns of sovereignty?64  While Anselm’s 
satisfaction theory may not have originally the same divine vindictive intent 
that its meaning seems to carry today, still it appears theologically 
unintelligible, ethically incredible, and pastorally unsound—within the 
framework of the socio-intellectual culture in place today—to speak of a 
God who demands propitiation through the sacrifice of a human being.  
On the other hand, while sensitivity to the metaphorical language 
operative in faith assertions is necessary to construct appropriate, 
meaningful, and significant ways of speaking about redemption today, 
caution should be taken in using a phenomenological approach to theories 
of redemption. Otherwise, our contemporary interpretations may fall to 
the other extreme of so disembodying Jesus from his own situated history 
to the extent that he loses all his distinctiveness as a historical person.65 
Still, for any meaningful appropriation of redemption to take place, there is 
a need to re-express traditional theories in new and different forms that 
break and transcend traditional patterns of political sovereignty.66 
It is a constructive task of theology to view the entire life of Jesus as 
imbued with redemptive significance. His life and message communicate 
the reality of redemption they signify—a solidarity with both God and 
humanity.67  In other words, based on the theory of communicative 
competence, Jesus communicated the reality of redemption through his 
twofold solidarity—a deep union with the Father and a profound solidarity  
 
 
 
 
64 See Fiorenza, “Critical Social Theory and Christology,” 100–101. 
65 See Michael Demetrius H. Asis, “Hermeneutical Theory and the Quest for the Historical 
Jesus: A Study of Two Christologies,” The Loyola Schools Review 1 (2001): 106. 
66 See Haight, Dynamics of Theology, 175–79. 
67 Fiorenza, “Critical Social Theory and Christology,” 104–5. 
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with others. This double commitment “brings to expression who Jesus is 
in himself.”68 Grounded on this unique understanding of himself, Jesus 
communicated the reality of human redemption through the language of 
his embodied existence—his life and his message.69 Jesus lived out the 
identity of one who was totally committed to God’s Rule and to  
the undivided loyalty to and love of both God and neighbor demanded by 
it, and paid dearly for this singular commitment. As Fiorenza writes: 
The gospels relate that precisely because of his life-praxis, his 
double solidarity, Jesus was condemned and executed. Since 
both the religious and political leaders played a role in his 
death, it would be inadequate to attribute his death mainly or 
solely to the responsibility of the one over the other, the 
self-identity expressed in his life-praxis must have offended 
both authorities. It was not his proclamation of superiority 
to the law alone. Nor was it merely his preaching of the 
kingdom that might have been understood in terms of 
possible zealot overtones. Instead it was precisely his life-
praxis as a totality, his radical solidarity expressed in his 
communicative words and actions, that lead [sic] to his 
death.70 
His proclamation of the Basileia, thus, was a message of an all-
embracing divine emancipatory solidarity that offended the unjust power 
structures of his day, both religious and political.  
In a world of human sin and injustice, such a message of solidarity can 
only be met with violent opposition. Not only does the cross determine 
Jesus’s self-identity in terms of his twofold solidarity, but it is at once both 
the testimony and consequence of a double commitment lived to the 
death. Such a life can only lead to vindication. Therefore, Jesus’s  
 
 
 
 
68 Ibid., 104. 
69 See ibid. 
70 Ibid. 
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resurrection is not a reversal of the penalty suffered by Jesus for a sinful 
humanity, but a validation of his unconditional commitment to both God 
and humankind in the face of rejection.71 
The redemptive life and death of Jesus renders present a solidarity, an 
“at-oneness,” that confronts and emancipates us from sin and alienation, 
including the systematic frustration of human well-being prevalent in 
today’s social structures. All forms of oppression, then, individual or social, 
can be viewed as the great divide that separates us from God and one 
another. Jesus as “Emmanuel,” therefore, redeems us precisely by being 
with us to emancipate us from alienation in whatever form it may appear—
meaninglessness, guilt, death, or social and structural evil. 
As emancipatory solidarity, redemption, then, at once atones and 
redeems, reconciles and saves. Jesus’s life bespeaks a saving divine 
presence immersed in the travails of human history.72  In his whole 
existence, in everything he said and did, Jesus pointed to and 
communicated the saving Reign of God—the great symbol for God’s 
redemptive presence in the world. Jesus in his humanity proclaimed with 
prophetic indignation and demonstrated with power, the Reign of God 
that continues to confront the evils of sin and death in the world.73 
Filipino Christologies from the Standpoint  
of Emancipatory Solidarity 
If a largely individualistic understanding of redemption prevails, then 
justification can only mean the salvation of the individual soul, and not of 
humanity. An almost mechanical view of salvation, which automatically 
dispenses heavenly reward simply by virtue of Christ’s sacrifice of himself 
to avert humanity’s damnation, reinforces the view commonly expressed 
by Filipino Catholics that one can find hope, inspiration, meaning, and— 
 
 
 
 
71 Ibid., 106. 
72 Fiorenza, “Redemption,” 850. Cf. Fiorenza, “Critical Social Theory and Christology,” 109. 
73 See Fiorenza, “Critical Social Theory and Christology,” 110.  
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ultimately—deliverance, not in Christ’s moral exhortations nor in the 
powerful witness of his life, but in his sacrificial death alone. Thus the 
typical Filipino Catholic is routinely branded as a “split-level Christian,” 
since there is in the typical pious Filipino believer a seeming incongruence 
between belief and witness.74 Such disparity comes as a result of a failure to 
see and appreciate the intrinsic value of making a personal and total 
commitment to Christ, whose moral program (vision, ideals, and teachings) 
for humanity—and not his sacrificial death alone—is key to its ultimate 
upliftment and redemption. 
Isn’t this a case of what critics of atonement theories call distorted 
ethical behavior resulting from inadequate or distorted theology?75 Doesn’t 
the gap between religious devotion and ethical life come from an 
inordinate amount of attention given to a particular aspect of Christ’s 
life—either his birth or death—and making it the sole criterion for 
salvation? Fiorenza’s theology of emancipatory solidarity forces us to see 
that the death of Christ lifts us up, “atones” for our inadequacies, and 
redeems our humanity not as payment for an eternal debt that only a 
divine being could make, but as the culmination of a life of heroic moral 
virtue in relation to both God and neighbor. His resurrection is not a 
reward for the horrendous human ordeal of sacrificing innocent life for all. 
It is vindication of a life well lived—a life fully lived.  
The perennial temptation in Filipino popular religious culture is to 
patronize Christ, not to follow and emulate his character and virtues. The 
two dominant Filipino images of Christ either patronize the Child Jesus, 
on the one hand, and the suffering victim, on the other. In the case of the 
former, he seems never to grow to real manhood.76 And on the other 
hand, by the time he does, the only way he can be relevant is to suffer and  
 
 
 
 
74  Elwood and Magdamo, Christ in Philippine Context, 10. See Jaime Bulatao, Split-Level 
Christianity (Manila: Ateneo University Press,1966), 21. 
75 See Daly, “Images of God and the Imitation of God: Problems with Atonement,” 36. 
76 Elwood and Magdamo, Christ in Phillipine Context, 6. 
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die. The disproportionate significance given to his suffering and death 
generally disregards the dynamic Christ of the Gospels—teacher, healer, 
wisdom figure, prophet—the exemplar of how it is to live a truly human 
life.77  The life and teachings of the man Jesus are overshadowed by 
practices of popular piety that involve either the Christ Child or the 
martyred Christ.78  And since the man Jesus is all but forgotten in a 
liturgical year that concentrates much of its moral exhortations on 
Christmas and Holy Week, a vacuum is indeed created that could have 
addressed the need for a more developed moral imagination and for an 
education with a sustained focus on the life and teachings of the man 
Jesus.79  This approach may in the process refocus rituals of popular 
religiosity toward a more integral and holistic Christian conversion and 
witness. Otherwise, the gap between Catholic faith and daily life shall 
always remain. 
And yet, for all the obvious objections that can be raised against the 
excesses of popular piety, even its so-called critics concede that “on a topic 
as deep as the Christian theology of the cross, there can be no 
single exhaustive understanding.” 80  The cross of Christ discloses a 
powerful image of salvation from sin that eludes systematic theological 
inquiry, and yet, continues to inform Christian ritual and worship.81 And it 
is precisely this revelatory, profoundly evocative potential that makes “the 
cross a powerful religious symbol of suffering humanity, even for many 
who are oppressed by other Christians and who look to Christ as their 
liberator, a symbol that indeed inspires their resistance.”82  
 
 
 
77 Ibid., 7. 
78 Alan J. Delotavo, “Images of Christ in Filipino Culture and Atonement Experiences,” Asia 
Journal of Theology 15, no. 1 (April 2001): 146. 
79 Delotavo suggests a more Christ-centered preaching in the parish. See ibid., 148. 
80 Haight, The Future of Christology, 76. 
81 Cahill, The Atonement Paradigm, 425. 
82 Ibid. 
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It may come as a surprise, therefore, that the Pasyon, which has 
traditionally extolled the virtues of docility and quiet suffering, provided  
the cultural framework for scattered social upheavals during the Spanish 
period. When religion wed—and exploited—local culture in the 
Philippines as part of the oppressive state apparatus, the same faith 
ironically gave many Filipinos a template for resistance against its colonial 
masters.83 Beltran explains: 
While the Christology from above can foster passivity and 
acceptance of things as they are, Filipino rebellions which 
were motivated by religious reasons have shown that the 
descending approach can also promote the questioning of 
the apparent givenness of things in the light of the belief in 
the absoluteness of divine authority. The traditional 
approach might have fostered the unquestioning acceptance 
of the givenness of the colonial structure during the period 
of Spanish domination. Nevertheless, we have seen that the 
reading of the Pasyon opened the minds of Filipinos to the 
relativism of all authority other than the divine. They aligned 
themselves to a vision which anticipated the judgment of 
God as revealed in Christ.84 
The Pasyon, hence, was not merely a narrative about the Second Person 
of the Trinity who in his incarnation as man had to suffer and die to once 
again open the gates of the Kingdom for a damned humanity.85  “The 
suffering Christ became an example par excellence for the Filipino who 
wanted to resist.”86 
 
 
83  Gabriel Tan, “Review of Pasyon and Revolution,” October 2, 2012, http:// 
www.goodreads.com/review/show/428648604, accessed October 25, 2013. 
84 Beltran, Christology of the Inarticulate, 218–19. 
85 Tan, “Review of Pasyon and Revolution.” 
86 Ibid. 
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Far from becoming an opiate to deaden the consciousness to human 
suffering by anticipating a paradise in the hereafter, religious faith had 
become key in the struggle for emancipation from oppression and human  
misery.87 Just as the struggle and crucifixion of Christ would culminate 
eventually in his victory over death, the struggle against the yoke of 
Spanish oppression was seen by the popular peasant movements as the 
Motherland’s journey from slavery to liberation, couched in the Pasyon’s 
“powerful images of transition: darkness to light, despair to hope, misery 
to salvation, death to life.”88 The revolutionary movement saw in suffering 
the inevitable cost of liberation. It was this belief that sustained their 
spiritual fortitude.89 
Cahill suggests that “if resistance and liberation are potential moral 
outcomes of an atonement paradigm that includes cross and sacrifice,” the 
Resurrection is that final element that completes this potential. 90  
Not only do the death and resurrection of Christ constitute one redeeming 
event as the New Testament kerygma consistently proclaims (1 Cor. 15:3-4), 
it is precisely so because, as Fiorenza points out emphatically, the 
Resurrection is not the reward for but the validation of Christ’s redemptive 
life of deep solidarity with both God and suffering humanity.  
A Conclusion  
Jesus paid the price of his life for a commitment that affirmed both his 
profound union with God and his compassionate solidarity with suffering 
humanity. Jesus died not as someone marked out for death by God in 
exchange for the retribution that a rebellious humanity so justifiably 
deserved, but as a consequence of a radically challenging message of divine 
emancipatory solidarity that upset the power structures of his day. 
 
 
 
87 Ibid. 
88 Ileto, Pasyon and Revolution, 18. Cf. Tan, “Review of Pasyon and Revolution.” 
89 See Tan, “Review of Pasyon and Revolution.” 
90  Cahill, The Atonement Paradigm, 425. Unfortunately, it is the resurrection that is least 
recognized and celebrated in much of popular religious literature, rituals of pious religiosity, and 
liturgical re-enactments.  
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Though not an end in itself, human suffering freely embraced can be 
viewed as the cost of one’s ongoing commitment to Gospel values, as 
made evident in the Beatitudes (Mt. 5:6, 10–11). This not only recognizes  
the centrality of Christ’s resurrection to the Christian Faith, but also the 
truly redemptive power of his very life and ministry of healing the sick and 
driving out oppressive spirits, of comforting the inconsolable, and 
embracing both the outcasts and the un-forgiven, of breaking bread with 
the people, and giving the poor and the misunderstood God’s special 
unconditional regard. All this offered the gracious presence of God, no 
less. The failure to see the redemptive, reconciling and healing hand of 
God in Christ’s life, ministry, and resurrection may result precisely in the 
kind of distorted understanding of divine justice (or retribution) that God 
metes out punishment for humanity’s offenses in the form of suffering, or 
requires the sacrifice of an innocent life as ransom payment for sin. 
 “Though [Christ] was in the form of God, he did not deem equality 
with God something to be grasped at. Rather, he emptied himself and took 
the form of a slave, . . . and it was thus that he humbled himself, obediently 
accepting even death on a cross” (Phil 2:6-8).  This divine solidarity with 
humanity is an image that gives consolation and hope to “the poor and 
disadvantaged [who] respond by instinct to this identification.”91  Is it 
because their disadvantaged social circumstances make them see the 
Cross—more than any other symbol—as a healing, reassuring sign of 
divine solidarity with their personal sufferings? After all, the poor—they 
only see the Crucifixion. It is everywhere. It is all there is.92 Are we who 
claim to be theological sophisticates in a position to judge their images and 
rituals to be adulterated expressions of faith? What we may consider with 
derision as an inarticulate crowd of worshippers’ bizarre devotion may be 
in truth their only access to faith and hope in a world that has so deprived 
them of the same. While this may have encouraged the kind of passivity in  
 
 
 
 
91 Philip Yancey, “Surveying the Wondrous Cross: Understanding the Atonement is About 
More Than Grasping a Theory,” Christian Today (May 2009): 72. 
92 Ibid.  
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the face of suffering so characteristic of Filipino piety, Philippine history 
bears witness to the real possibility that the image of the hero-martyr—in 
the Pasyon or in the martyred Benigno Aquino, Jr.93—may spark the kind 
of “revolution” that anticipates the salvation in the hereafter by embracing, 
overcoming, saving—indeed, redeeming—the sinfulness, the dislocation, 
the injustice and oppression of the present.  
Epilogue 
On the last year of his public ministry, a Jewish itinerant preacher—a 
man wildly popular, if not notorious, in his time—mounted a colt and 
went up to Jerusalem to celebrate the Jewish Passover—a feast 
commemorating Jewish liberation from Egyptian oppression. In the great 
tradition of the Hebrew prophets, this preacher challenged the brokerage 
function of the revered Jewish Temple priesthood, unnerved the Roman-
backed Jewish establishment,94 and triggered for himself a quick succession 
of events that would lead inevitably to the fate of any Old Testament 
prophet. 
Death (a brutal one under his Roman executioners), however, was not 
the end of the story for this peasant politico-religious agitator. His closest 
associates continued to speak not only of affectionate loyalty to him and 
his cause, but also of a resurrection 95 —clearly a divine vindication, a 
recognition of the uninterrupted, abiding divine presence at work throughout 
his life of service and witness that was at once atoning and redemptive, not 
only for the sins of Israel, but for the whole world as well.  
  
 
 
93 Benigno S. ‘Ninoy’ Aquino, Jr. (1932–1983) was the chief political rival of then President 
Ferdinand E. Marcos (1917–1989). His assassination in August 21, 1983 led to a series of public 
demonstrations calling for the resignation of high-ranking public officials responsible for the 
security of Aquino, including Marcos himself. This pressured Marcos to hold early presidential 
elections to regain public confidence. However, the massive fraud which marred the snap elections 
sparked a nationwide protest movement. This culminated in the Bloodless EDSA Revolution of 
February 1986. Ninoy Aquino was husband to Corazon C. ‘Cory’ Aquino (1933–2009), herself an 
icon of Philippine democracy, and father to Benigno Simeon ‘Noynoy’ Aquino, III, 15th president 
of the Republic of the Philippines. 
94  See John Dominic Crossan, Jesus: A Revolutionary Biography (New York: Harper Collins, 
1994), 197. 
95 See ibid., 198. 
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